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IN THE SUPREHE COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 17619

JAHES E. BALLENBERGER,

Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The Appellant, James Ballenberger, appeals from a
conviction of second degree felony theft in the Third Judicial
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This criminal action was brought by the State of Utah
against James E. Ballenberger for second degree felony theft
alleging that Mr. Ballenberger exercised

unauthorized control

over the property of R. C. Ashby on May 15, 1980.
On March 5, 1981, before the Honorable Jay E. Banks,

, Defendant Ballenberger moved to suppress certain evidence on the
ground that it was seized pursuant to an illegal arrest.

The

motion to suppress the evidence was denied.
The case was then tried before a jury, the Honorable Jay
E. Banks presiding which convicted Defendant Ballenberger of the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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offense of theft, a second degree felony. He was thereafter

sentenced to the Utah State Prison on March 5, 1981 for a ten,
of 1 to 15 years.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant asks that the jury verdict, and the sentence
imposed pursuant thereto, be reversed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At approximately 3:00 a.m. on May 15, 1980, Officer

LeVitre, of the Murray City Police Department, observed James:.
Ballenberger and Lynn Fulton in an automobile coming toward hie
on the Hyland Dairy access road, approximately 5400 South 9th
East (Tr. 25-29).

The vehicle in which Hr. Ballenberger was

riding made a sharp turn into the Oakwood Village Shopping
Center (Tr. 27).

However, the car did not swerve nor did the

tires screech (Tr. 29-30).

Officer LeVitre observed the vehicl

until he decided that it was not going through the Oakwood
storage area (Tr. 31-32).

Officer LeVitre then proceeded

through the Oakwood Village Shopping storage area (Tr. 31).
Officer LeVitre located Mr. Ballenberger' s car in a wel
lighted area of the Oakwood Village Shopping Center (Tr. 36).
Noticing the raised hood (Tr. 32), Officer LeVitre then as~d
Mr. Ballenberger what he was doing, to which he explained he
merely checking the oil (Tr. 33, 34).

Officer LeVitre then

- 2 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Wi

stepped from his patrol car and asked for identification (Tr.
34) .

LeVitre testified that he observed a CB radio, an
antenna and some stereo head phones in the back seat of the
vehicle

(Tr. 36).

He asked Mr. Ballenberger "about the

property in the back seat" (Tr. 35), but Mr. Ballenberger did
not respond (Tr. 37).
At that time Officer Hansen, responding to LeVitre's

I
: I

:1'1

call, arrived (Tr. 131).

Officer Hansen took Mr. Ballenberger

into his patrol car to question him while Officer LeVitre took
Lynn Fulton, who was also riding in the vehicle with Mr.
Ballenberger, into his car to be questioned (Tr. 131).

In

Officer Hansen's patrol car Mr. Ballenberger was first read the
"Miranda warning" and then questioned about the property in the
back seat of the vehicle (Tr. 38).

Mr. Fulton was also

questioned in Mr. LeVitre' s car after receiving the Miranda
warning from Officer LeVitre (Tr. 38).

At this point no theft

had been reported nor was there any indication that the property
in the back seat was stolen.
Following Fulton's interrogation, Officer LeVitre
conversed briefly with Officer Hansen.
i:ook Mr.

Officer LeVitre then

Fulton to 550 East 5300 South to observe a parked Van

(Tr. 131, 132).

Mr. Robbie Ashby, was located and returned to

the Oakdale Village Shopping Center(Tr. 133).

Mr. Ashby then

identified the property in the back of Mr. Ballenberger's car

- 3 -
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being his (Tr. 134).

Mr. Ballenberger was required to wait

'i;

1

Officer Hansen while Mr. Fulton traveled with Officer LeVitre
some five blocks to awaken Mr. Ashby, question him and returr,
the scene (Tr. 131-134).

At that time Mr. Ballenberger and:h.!

Fulton were formally placed under arrest (Tr. 134).
The time sequence in which the foregoing took place'" [
from approximately 3: 10 a. m., when the Ballenberger vehicle

w0;

I

i

observed, to 3: 19 a.m., when the suspects were advised of thei::
rights, to 3: 40 a. m. when they were formally arrested (Tr, 8,

!

134).
ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT SUPPRESSING
EVIDENCE SEIZED SUBSEQUENT TO AN ILLEGAL ARREST
A.

At the time of the arrest, the officers did not hav:,

probable cause; therefore,

the subsequent arrest was

I
1

illegal and any evidence obtained thereafter should~
suppressed.
Generally, the moment at which an officer restrains th<
freedom of an individual for more than a momentary questioning,!
he has made an "arrest."

An arrest does not require that the

individual be taken to the station house and prosecuted for the
crime.

Nor does it require an officer formally pronouncing tha:

an individual is arrested.

In the landmark case of Terry v.

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court outlined when an officer is

- 4 -
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:

justified to "stop and frisk."

The Court also cautioned that

when an individual's freedom to walk away is limited, or when an

individual is detained more than briefly, such detention
elevates a "stop" to a full arrest.
It must be recognized that whenever a police
officer accosts an individual and restrains his
freedom to walk away, he has "seized" that person.
Id.,atl6.
Although the differentiation between an allowable stop
and an arrest is difficult to ascertain, whenever a person is
restrained for more than a "momentary" period, Rio v. United
States, 364 U.S. 253, 264 (1960), or "briefly," Terry v. Ohio,
392U. S. 1, 10 (1968), therestraintmustbeviewedas an
arrest.
According to Officer LeVitre, he first stopped and
questioned Mr. Ballenberger as to any possible automobile
problems and as to the property within the automobile (Tr.
32-35).

Such momentary questioning is within the purview of the

stop and frisk doctrine enunciated by Terry.

However, once Mr.

Ballenberger was ordered to step into Officer Hansen's car and
then read the Miranda warning, he was involved in much more than
a momentary questioning (Tr. 38).

At that point it was

inconceivable that Mr. Ballenberger felt he was at liberty to
leave.

In fact, it was clear that Officer Hansen required not

only that Mr. Ballenberger submit to the questioning, but that
he wait in his presence while Mr. Fulton traveled with Officer
LeVitre some five blocks to awaken Mr. Ashby and question him

- 5 -
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(Tr. 131-134).

He also was required to await Mr. Ashby's

arrival back to the scene where he was being detained.
According to the two officer's estimate of this time lapse,:'.:
Ballenberger was restrained for at least twenty minutes (Tr.:,
134). This total control over Hr. Ballenberger amounted to mu:·
more than momentary questioning; it represented an arrest not
supported by probable cause.
The circumstances under which Mr. Ballenberger was
arrested is analogous to these in the case of People v. Miller
496 P.2d 1228 (Cal. 1972).

In that case defendant was

fo~d

sleeping in a car in a private lot. The investigating officer
observed electronic equipment and a coat in the rear seat of::.
vehicle.

He later learned of an outstanding warrant on the

defendant and arrested him.

The officer asked the defendant

whether he could take the coat and electronic equipment, butt:
defendant refused permission.

The officer then seized the gooc·

and later found marijuana in the coat pocket of the defendant
At the trial the defense sought to suppress the evidenc
arguing that the officer did not have prob ab le cause to arrest
the defendant.

The court held that absent exigent

circumstances, the mere fact that the defendant was found
sleeping in a car in a private parking lot with electronic
equipment in the back seat, did not amount to probable cause tc
arrest the defendant for receiving stolen property.

The court

further held that the defendant's refusal to waive his Fourth

- 6 -
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AQendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizure did
not amount to "suspicious" activity evidencing criminal conduct.
The court ruled that the officers lacked probable cause and that
the evidence should therefore be excluded.
~

The rationale of the

case is applicable to the case at bar.
In the Miller case the court found that the defendant

sleeping in his car in a private parking lot did not give rise
to reasonable suspicion.

Likewise, in this case Mr.

Ballenberger working underneath the hood of his car in a
well-lighted area of a private parking lot does not give rise to
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
In the Miller case, the additional fact that electronic
equipment happened to be in the back seat of the car in plain
view did not amount to probable cause because there was no
inference that the equipment was stolen.

The court in that case

stated:
The additional fact that he happened to be
carrying electronic equipment at the time would
not, in itself, support an inference that the
equipment was stolen, particularly since the
police had not received any report of the theft
of such material. Id., at 1232.
The court reasoned that:
Unless it is first established that the police
officer believed that a crime . . . had been
committed by the [defendants], the issue of
probable cause does not arise, for it would be
a logical absurdity for the courts to be asked
to determine the reasonableness of an officer's
belief that the particular crime had been
committed unless it were first established that

- 7 -
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the officer did entertain such a belief.
at 1233.

Id.,

In this case, at the time the police officers ordered
Mr. Ballenberger into their patrol car, read him the

Mir~~

warning and questioned him, there was no indication that the
property on the back seat was stolen.
that it was or might have been.

The officers only

I

~i

i

Because there was no evidence

of a crime having been committed prior to the officers taking
Mr. Ballenberger into custody, the officers obviously had no
probable cause for an arrest.

I

Therefore, the evidence obtaine:!

subsequent to the illegal arrest should have been suppressed.
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).

I
B.

The officers did not have an articulable suspicion I

to justify an investigatory detention, a stop, and
therefore any evidence obtained thereafter should be
suppressed.

When Officer Ray LeVitre approached Mr. Ballenberger,
any suspicions he might have had would only have been based on

I

(1) the lateness of the hour and (2) the fact burglaries had
been reported in the area two days previous (Tr. 43, 48).

Thesi:

two factors, independently or in conjunction with each other,

at

not constitute sufficient grounds to justify an investigative
stop.

In People v. Bower, 597 P.2d 115 (Cal. 1979), an officer

observed a white man, the defendant, late at night enter a

- 8 -
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I

l

predominantly black colllillunity noted for its high crime rate.
The officer had never previously observed a white person enter

this neighborhood at night and therefore when groups of blacks
started mingling around the white individual, the officer became
somewhat suspicious.

The officer then approached the group and

stopped and frisked the defendant.

At trial the defendant

claimed that the lateness of the hour combined with the high
crime rate of the area were inadequate grounds to justify a
detention, i.e. a stop and frisk.

The court held that a white

man entering a predominantly black residential area having
"high" crime rate in the evening did not provide a sufficient
basis for the officer's detention.
In the case at bar, Officers LeVitre and Hansen relied
solely on the lateness of the hour and the fact that crimes had
been reported in the area previously to justify their action of
detaining Mr. Ballenberger, contrary to People v. Bower, in
which the "night-time" factor and a "high crime" area cannot
justify a detention.

Where such detention is not justifiable, a

prolonged detention in an officer's patrol car where the
arrestee has been read the Miranda warning, subjected to the
interrogation of an officer and held there while his fellow
companion is taken from the scene and later returned, is
likewise not justifiable.
Similarly, in Fare v. Tony C., 582 P.2d 557 (Cal. 1978),
two young blacks were walking down the street during school

- 9 -
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hours.

The officer, knowing that the boys should have been,

school and remembering that several burglaries perpetrated bv
.

black youths had recently occurred in the area made an

I

1

investigative stop and subsequently seized allegedly stolen
property from the boys.

At trial, counsel for the boys arguec

that the officer had insufficient evidence to support a
suspicion necessary to justify an investigative stop or
detention.

The court held that circumstances known to the

police officer did not support a reasonable suspicion that the
minors were involved in criminal activity, thus the ensuing
investigative stop was unlawful and the property seized was no:
admissible.

The court reasoned that even though the action oi

the boys was somewhat suspicious in that they were on the strn
at an hour when they probably should not have been, and even
though several burglaries had occurred which were reportedly

1

committed by black youths, much more is needed to reasonably
suspect that a person is participating in a crime.

The court

found that certain factors must exist in order to justify an
investigative stop or detention.

The Court stated:

The circumstances known or apparent to the
officer must include specific and articulable
facts causing him to suspect that (1) some
activity relating to crime has taken place or
is occurring or is about to occur, and (2) the
person he intends to stop or detain is involved
in that activity. Not only must he
.
subjectively entertain such a suspicion, but it
must also be objectively reasonable for him to
do so: the facts must be such as would cause
any reasonable police officer in a like
position, drawing when appropriate on training
- 10 -
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and experience . . . to suspect the same
criminal activity and the same involvement by
the person in question. Id., at 959.
The court in Fare v. Tony C., 582 P.2d 957 (Cal. 1978), held
chat the officer could not articulate more than a mere suspicion
and that a suspicion or a hunch did not justify an investigatory
stop or an arrest.

The court specifically stated that:

. . . an investigative stop or detention predicated
on mere curiosity, rumor or hunch is unlawful, even
though the officer may be acting in complete good
faith. Id., at 959.
The facts of the Fare v. Tony C., 582 P.2d 957 (Cal.
1978), case are analogous to the circumstances in this case.

\./hen Officers Levitre and Hansen approached Mr. Ballenberger,
their justification for the original stop was the lateness of
the hour and the fact that burglaries had previously occurred in
the area.

Under the rationale of either the Bower case or the

~case,

the lateness of the hour or the fact that the

incident occurred after regular store hours is not sufficient
ground to justify an investigatory stop.

The Bower case

specifically stated that the fact that the defendant was
observed at night had little or no bearing to justify an
articulable suspicion.

The court underscored this by explaining

that:
No reasonable suggestion of criminality
is added by the fact it was dark when the officer
observed appellant. Strictly speaking, the "nighttime factor" is not activity by a citizen, and
this court has warned that this factor "should be
appraised with caution" . . . and that it has at
most, "minimal importance" in evaluating the
- 11 -
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propriety of an intrusion . . . People v. Bower,
597 P.Zd 115 (Cal. 1979).
Additionally, the fact that some criminal activity 'nJ.
al;
previously occurred in the area is not in and of itself groun,
for suspicion.

In the Tony C. case the fact that

burglar~s

occurred a few days earlier perpetrated by young blacks did
rise to the level of an articulable suspicion when other youn[
blacks entered the area.

Likewise, in the Bower case

the court specifically found that the officer's assertion that

I
1

· 1

I

the incident occurred in a high crime area did not elevate the I
I
circumstances to a reasonable suspicion of criminality. In th:!
case the court stated:

\

Finally, the officer's assertion that the
location lay in a "high crime" area does not
elevate these facts into a reasonable suspicion
of criminality. The "high crime" area factor is
not an "activity" of an individual . . . As a
result, this court has appraised this factor with
caution and has been reluctant to conclude that a
location's crime rate transforms otherwise innocent·
appearing circumstances into circumstances justifying
the seizure of an individual. Id., at 119.
Thus, under the Bower rationale, the fact that the Oakwood
shopping area may have been the subject of criminal activity in
the past, is not sufficient to make Mr. Ballenberger's presence\
there a reasonably suspicious activity.
Moreover, the Oakwood Village Shopping Center was not
even an area of high criminal activity.

Officer LeVitre was

merely alerted to the area by routine dispatches which two days
previous to the occurrence indicated that a break-in had

- 12 -
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1

occurred in the Oakwood Village Shopping Center (Tr. 48).

The

routine report of the dispatcher indicating a break-in does not
elevate the Oakwood Village Shopping Center to a "high crime"
area.

Mr. Ballengerger' s mere presence at the Oakwood Village

shopping area was not sufficient to amount to an articulable
suspicion in light of his innocent activity engaged in there.
Neither does his failure to answer concerning the
property in the back of the car in which he was riding elevate
his behavior to that which is reasonably suspicious.

A person' s

mere refusal to waive a Fourth Amendment right may not be
transformed into "suspicious" activity evidencing criminal
conduct.

"The courts have, of course, condemned any state

practice which imposes adverse treatment on individuals for
exercising constitutional rights intended to protect against
such adversity,"

People v. Miller, 496 P.2d 1228, 1232 (Cal.

1972).

Therefore, at the time Officers LeVitre and Hansen
approached Mr. Ballenberger, read him the Miranda warning and
questioned him in their police vehicle, the officers were
without any articulable suspicion.

At that time the goods had

!'.£.!been identified as stolen property, and the only support the
officers had for their belief that Mr. Ballenberger might have
been engaged in a criminal activity was the lateness of the hour

and the area in which he was found.

Under the circumstances

neither of these two factors would justify an investigatory

- 13 -
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detention.

Accordingly, the evidence obtained subsequent to

investigatory detention should have been suppressed.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO SUPPRESS THE
EVIDENCE WHERE THE SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED STOLEN
PROPERTY WAS WITHOUT A WARRANT AND ABSENT EXIGENT
CIRCUMSTANCES.

The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a
warrantless search is not justified by probably cause in the
absence of exigent circumstances.

In Coolidge v. New Hampshi:,

403 U.S. 443 (1971), the Court specifically stated:
[N]o amount of probable cause can justify a
warrantless search or seizure absent "exigent
circumstances," Id., at 468.
In this instance there were no exigent circumstances ,
which required a seizure without a warrant.

Sometime after }tr

Ballenberger and Mr. Fulton had been taken into custody, the co
in which they were riding was towed to the Murray Police Static
(Tr. 39).

While the car was at the Police Station, the proper:

was seized without a search warrant (Tr. 39).

In his testimon>

Officer LeVitre stated that there was no danger of losing t~
property but that a warrant was not obtained simply because th,,
property had been identified by the victim (Tr. 39).

Under the

holding of the Coolidge case, Officer LeVitre was not justilW
in seizing the property before obtaining a warrant from an
impartial magistrate.

The fact that the car was at the police
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department, combined with the fact that the property had been
identified by the victim was not sufficient to allow Officer
LeVitre or any other officer to search the vehicle and to seize
the property contained within.

Accordingly, evidence obtained

by the warrantless seizure should have been suppressed.

POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS THE
CHARGE WHEN PROSECUTION FAILED TO PRODUCE MATERIAL
EVIDENCE WHICH WAS DIRECTLY RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE
OF THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY ALLEGEDLY STOLEN.
A.

Defendant's right of confrontation was violated by

the failure of the prosecution to physically admit into
evidence all the property that was allegedly stolen.
The main purpose for the right of confrontation is to
secure the opportunity of cross-examination, Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400 ( 1965) .

In interpreting this right, this Court has

long held that a defendant may not be convicted unless he has
the opportunity of confronting and cross-examining the witnesses
against him, State v. Mannion, 57 P. 542 (Utah 1899).

The right

of confrontation not only affords an opportunity to
cross-examine, but also enables the jury to observe the demeanor
of the witnesses for the state, Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719
(1968).

In this case, the value of the property which was stolen
is an essential element of the prosecution's case.

- 15 -
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Defendant was charged with second degree felony theft under
Utah Criminal Code, Sec. 76-6-412 U.C.A.

(1953), as amended.

establish second degree felony theft, the prosecution has to
prove that the property stolen exceeded a value of $1,000. E
evidence did not establish that value, Defendant should haw
been acquitted of second degree felony theft.
At trial, none of the physical evidence of the stolen
property, the tools, the speaker, or the C. B. , were introduce( i
into evidence.

The only physical evidence before the jury

identifying the stolen property were two 4x4 Polaroid
photographs of poor quality which depicted only the speakers,
C.B. headphones, antenna and the tool box (Tr. 93).

The tools

were not admitted into evidence, nor were they depicted bya
photograph, even though they were significantly the most
valuable items stolen.

Where all the stolen property was not present at trial I
Defendant did not have an opportunity to adequately
cross-examine the Mr. Ashby, the State's only witness on value.
with regard to the property's value, since the property in
question was absent from the proceeding and was therefore not
subject to observation and inspection.

The jurors also could

not examine the property to determine the weight they would givi
to Mr. Ashby's testimony.

Moreover, Defendant's expert witness

could not most persuasively rebut the victim's testimony
concerning property value where there was no property to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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examine.

This is especially critical in light of the testimony

of Mr. Ashby that the stolen property was used, but in good or
fair condition.

Under these circumstances Defendant was denied

his right to cross-examine and his right of confrontation was
seriously undermined.
The circumstances at trial do not evidence bad faith, or
a deliberate suppression of evidence by the prosecution.
case is not cut from that cloth.

477 (Utah 1975).

This

See State v. Stewart, 544 P.2d

Defendant is contending, however, that because

the stolen property was simply absent from the trial, he was
effectively denied his right to cross-examine on the value of
the property.
This case is analogous to the case of State v. Havas,
601P.2d1197 (Nev. 1979), where the defendant was charged with
forcible rape.

The defendant was convicted and appealed arguing

that the failure to produce potentially relevant evidence at
trial, the undergarments of the victim, violated his due process
rights.

There was no indication of prosecutorial misconduct.

The garments were either lost, destroyed or simply not taken
into possession.

The Nevada Supreme Court held that the

evidence was material, and that the failure of the prosecution
to produce the material evidence violated the defendants due
process rights without the necessity of showing the reason for
its unavailability.

- 17 -
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'

Similarly, the evidence excluded from Mr. Ballengergt·i
trial was clearly material.

Its absence alone justifies

reversal.
This Court has expressed its policy to allow the ju:::
the opportunity to view the property which was stolen in an
effort to aid the jury in a determination of its value.

In

State v. Harris, 519 P.2d 247 (1974) this Court, in a case
dealing with the fraudulent use of a credit card, stated:
Value is something at which the jury may take a
look. The owner of an article is competent as
to its value, and such testimony is admissible,
but neither inviolate or impervious to
disbelief. The jury may take a view of the
item for excellence or shoddiness and look
through the same spectacles at the witness to
determine the latter's imagination or
credibility, -- and the verdict is its as to
value. Id., at 248.
See also State v. Limb, 581 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978).
Where the exclusion of relevant and material evidence
seriously undermines defendant's right to confrontation and is
directly related to an essential element of proof, the policy:
this Court, as articulated in Harris should be followed.

This

Court should rule under the facts of this case that the jury
should have had an opportunity to observe the actual physical
evidence, and that the defendant should have had an opportunit:
for meaningful cross-examination.

Quite obviously, where~

is at issue, and the best evidence of value is not admitted in'
evidence and is unavailable, defendant's opportunity for
meaningful cross-examination has been severely undermined.
- 18 -
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Accordingly, such circumstances so seriously impair defendant's
right of confrontation that this Court should rule that he was
accually denied said right and reverse his conviction.
B.

The evidence below was insufficient as a matter of

law to support a conviction of second degree felony
theft.
At the close of prosecution's case, counsel for the
Defendant made a motion to dismiss based on the sufficiency of
the evidence (Tr. 145).

The trial court denied this motion (Tr.

14 5) .

The standard required for the Defendant to successfuly
overturn a verdict on the grounds of insufficiency of the
evidence as stated in State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 (Utah 1977),
is that reasonable minds would not differ.

This court stated:

In order for the defendant to successfully
challenge and overturn a verdict on the ground
of insufficiency of the evidence, it must
appear that upon viewing the evidence
reasonable minds must necessarily entertain a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime. Id., at 68.
See also State v. Mills, Utah 530 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1975); State
v. Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 470 P.2d 246 (1970) and State v.
Danks, 10 Utah 2d 162, 350 P.2d 146 (1960).
In the case at bar there was not sufficient evidence to
go to the jury on the issue of second degree felony theft.

The

prosecution did not present physical evidence of all the
property which was stolen.

The only physical evidence, the two

- 19 -

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Polaroid photographs, did not include any of the tools (Exh::,
2-S, 4-S).

According to the testimony of Mr. Ashby, these t:

comprised the most valuable portion of the property taken, w::
a total cost to the victim of more than $1,800, with an
estimated value of $1,300 (Tr. 94-100).
Counsel for the Defendant introduced his expert to
testify as to the value of the stolen tools (Tr. 193-195).
These tools were not new but had been used by the Defendant C,

96-100).

Defendant's expert testified that the value of useo

tools was significantly less than the new tools (Tr. 193-2161.
But because the prosecution failed to produce the tools at
trial, Defendant's expert was prevented from examining the
tools.
Where there is no physical evidence of the stolen tooi
before the jury, the jury is left with only the item pictured.
the Polaroid photographs, the CB, speaker, antenna and
headphone.

The value of items pictured in the Polaroid

photographs, the CB, the speakers, the antenna and headphones:·
Ashby's estimation amounted to $245 (Tr. 99-102), and is
therefore insufficient to justify a verdict of second degree
felony theft.
While the owner of property may testify as to its valui
·
and
where that testimony is controverted by an expert witness,
the testimony is on the value of used automatic tools,
reasonable minds, could not determine that the value of the

- 20 -
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1

I

tools exceeded the value determination made by Defendant's

eipert.

That being the case, the evidence was insufficient to

convict for second degree felony theft.

CONCLUSION
The constitutional right of the people to be secure
against unreasonable searches and seizures is meaningful only if
officers of the law are not given unfettered authority to
intrude on the privacy of the individual on more than a mere
whim or suspicion.

Where an officer cannot articulate a

suspicion, he should not be allowed to make an investigatory
interrogation or stop.

Where an officer does not have probable

cause, he should not be allowed to make an arrest.

Where an

officer plans to seize property in the possession of another, he
must have a warrant unless the exigencies of a situation justify
an exception.

Anything less would invite intrusions upon

constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more than
substantial inarticulate hunches.
Likewise, the right of trial by jury is meaningful only
if the defendant has an opportunity to rebut the allegations of
the prosecution.

Where the defendant is denied the opportunity

to cross examine, he is denied its right of confrontation.
Where the physical evidence of the property stolen does not

- 21 -
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amount to mandatory monetary value for second degree theft,:
evidence is insufficient.
Accordingly, where the evidence is obtained through;:
improper investigatory interrogation, arrest, or an improper
seizure, the evidence obtained thereby should be suppressed ar
the trial court determination reversed.

1

In addition, wheret:[

absence of relevant material physical evidence results in a

I
!

denial of the right of confrontation or where the absence of
physical evidence prevents the prosecution from proving a
material element of its case, the conviction of the trial cou::[
should be reversed and a new trial ordered.

Respectfully submitted,
THURMAN & CONDI:
'

I
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